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Effective protection of the East African Transfer Taxes 
Peter A. Diamond -
In the attempt to encourage economic cooperation and integration a s 
well as to foster more rapid economic growth of the less industrialized 
parts of East Africa, the Treaty for East African Cooperation introduced 
transfer taxes. These are tariffs on intercountry trade within East Africa 
which are levied at lower rates than the external tariff. While it would no 
doubt be interesting to examine the full impact of the Treaty, this paper 
examines a much more tractable problem - the level of effective protection 
afforded by the transfer tax structure. That is, formulas are developed, for 
various levels of tariff rates and import contents, to show how much higher 
costs of production can be in Kenya, say, than in the rest of the world and 
still permit a Kenyan firm ot compete in the Tanzanian or Ugandan market 
Similarly it is calculated how much higher costs in Tanzania can be than those 
in Kenya, Uganda, or abroad and still permit the Tanzanian firm to compete. 
The intention of the Treaty appears to be to afford some protection for Kenya 
in the Tanzanian and Ugandan markets (and Uganda in the Tanzanian market) 
relative to foreign firms while also giving the home country, Tanzania or Uganda 
some protection relative to the more industrialised East African partners. 
The transfer tax, however is levied on the value of the commodity 
at the border of the taxing country, less any duty that has been paid on 
imported inputs. The imported inputs themselves, however are subject to 
transfer tax as well as having been subject to tariff duty on entering East 
Africa. This aspect of the transfer tax implies that for some values of tax 
rates and .import contents, Kenyan and Ugandan firms are at a disadvantage in 
the Tanzanian market relative to firms outside East Africa. Thus, the apparent 
intent of the Treaty is not met due to the'complications of effective tariff 
protection. 
.After a presentation of the relevant parts of the Treaty, effective 
protection is analysed, first for wholly East African goods and than for goods 
with an import content. This analysis is done in a static setting which is 
briefly commented on in the concluding two sections of the paper. 
Treaty for East"African Cooperation 
A transfer tax is a tariff.imposed on trade between countries in the 
East African Community. The Treaty provides that a country which is in deficit 
in it's balance of trade in manufactured goods with the remainder of East 
Africa may levy transfer taxes on manufactured imports. Thus, in the present 
circumstances Tanzania and Uganda, but not Kenya may levy transfer taxes. The 
levying of these taxes is further restricted in that the value of imports from 
one country to another subject to taxation cannot exceed the trade deficit 
(in manufactured goods) between these two countries. Thus, Uganda can levy 
taxes against Kenyan but not Tanzanian goods. The ad valorem rate of tax is 
chosen by the importing country subject to a maximum of one-half the ad valorem 
rate of customs duty on importation of the same good from outside East Africa. 
The base on which the tax is levied is defined as the value of the import at 
the border of the taxing country less any duty that has been paid on imported 
u 
inputs into production. The list of manufactured goods which can be taxed is 
further restricted by two conditions on manufacture of the good in the taxing 
country. First, production of the good in the taxing country must be at least 
15% of home consumption or worth at least two million shillings. Second, the 
taxing country cannot export more than 30% of its production of this commodity 
to the other countries of East Africa. Any commodity can be subject to transfer 
• ~ 5 tax in one country for no more than eight years. 
Wholly East African Good -
- . Let us consider a commodity which is simultaneously being imported 
into East Africa and being produced both by a country which can levy transfer 
taxes and by a country whose produce is subject to transfer tax-. For ease of 
reference, let us consider the Tanzanian :market in which a homogeneous good 
. of Tanzanian, Kenyan,and foreign manufacture is simultaneously for sale. Let 
us further assume that the good contains no imported components when it is 
produced in East Africa, Comparing a Tanzanian firm to a foreign firm we shall 
ask how much higher the costs of production can be in Tanzania than in the rest 
of the world (including transport to- Tanzania ) . and. still permit the Tanzanian 
firm to break even. The ratio of Tanzanian costs to foreign costs will be 
called the Tanzanian break-even cost ratio. This ratio minus one would be the 
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7 effective protection. ) Let us note that this does not directly tell us 
how much Tanzanian production will be induced by the tariff which permits 
higher costs. That depends on a variety of factors including the actual 
costs of production in Tanzania and the elasticity of supply of the inputs 
into production. It is simply an indication of the level of inducement as 
well as a measure of the increased cost to consumers from having Tanzanian 
production. Similarly we can compare Kenyan production costs (including 
transport to Tanzania) with foreign production costs. We will call this ratio 
the Kenyan break-even ratio. (Note that this reflects Kenyan production for 
•the;Tanzanian market. Analysis of Kenyan production for the Kenyan market 
parallels that of Tanzanian production for the Tanzanian market.) Thirdly we 
can take the ratio of Tanzanian break-even cost to Kenyan break-even cost to 
obtain an indication of the protection given Tanzanian firms relative to 
Kenyan firms. 
Since we are considering a homogeneous commodity, the price at 
which the good can be sold in Tanzania is the same for the produce of the 
three different origins. Since the Tanzanian firm pays no taxes or tariffs 
while the foreign firm faces a tariff, the comparison of these two costs is 
straightforward. Let us denote by p the price of the foreign produced good 
at the Tanzanian border. Let us denote by t the ad valorem tariff rate on 
foreign manufactures. Then the equilibrium price for this commodity in 
Tanzania is p(l+t). Thus the Tanzanian firm can just break even if its costs 
q^ just equal the equilibrium price. Taking the ratio of Tanzanian costs to the 
foreign price at the Tanzanian border, we have the Tanzanian break-even cost 
rat io 
(1) V = 1 + f p 
Now let us consider a Kenyan firm producing for the Tanzanian market 
. - 9 at a cost q . The Kenyan firm is subject to a transfer tax at the K 
ad valorem rate it. Thus the Kenyan firm can just break even if its costs of 
production plus transfer tax payments equal the: equilibrium price in Tanzania, 
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p(l+t). Frail this equality we can calculate the Kenyan break even cost 
ratio 
(2) qK 1 + t —r p 1 + St 
Taking the ratio of Tanzanian to. Kenyan break-even costs we 
obtain an indication of Tanzanian protection relative to Kenya. 
<3> ^ - 1 +it ' 
. .. 
Table 1 contains examples of these three cost ratios calculated for 
.ad valorem duty rates of 30%, 50%, and 100%. 
Imported Inputs 
Now let us consider a good with import content, for example radios 
which are assembled in East Africa from imported parts, or clothing which is 
made from Imported cloth. Let us denote by p^ the price of the final good 
(manufactured abroad) at the Tanzanian border. Let us denote by p2 the 
price of the imported inputs at the. Tanzanian border. If Tanzania imports 
final 
the/good rather than the intermediate good, the cost difference is p^-p2• 
From the point of view of Tanzania this difference represents the cost of 
production for completing the manufacture of the good^ if production takes 
place abroad. In terms of protecting a Tanzanian firm., we are interested in 
the cost of production which takes place in.Tanzania. Thus we wish to compare 
the costs of the production which is done in Tanzania to the world costs 
defined above. We are interested thus in the total costs of a Tanzanian 
firm less the cost (including duty) of the input. Let us denote by t the 
ad valorem duty rate on the final good. Le us denote by at the ad valorem 
duty rate on the intermediate good. Thus a is the ratio of intermediate good 
duty rate to final good duty rate. 
In equilibrium the Tanzanian firm sells its output at the price 
p^(l+t) while it must pay p2(l+at) for its imported input. Thus a Tanzanian 
firm can just break even if its costs of production in Tanzania equal the 

difference in these two equilibrium prices 
C-0 qT = P1(l+t) - P2(l+at). 
Dividing q^ in equation (4) bv we obtain the break even cost ratio for 
a Tanzanian firm. Let us define b (=P2/P1) to be the import content of the 
good, evaluated at world prices. Then, replacing p^ by bp^ we can express 
the break-even cost ratio as 
qT _ 1 + t - b(l + at) 
p (1-b) 1 - b 
Recalling that we defined effective protection as the break even 
cost ratio minus one, we can define nominal protection as the ad valorem 
duty rate on the final good. In the case of a wholly East African good 
nominal protection and effective protection are the same as.can be seen 
from Table 1 or from equation (5) when b is set equal to zero. However in the 
case of a good with import content effective protection exceeds nominal 
protection if the final good tariff rate exceeds the intermediate good tariff 
rate: that is if a is less than one. The converse holds when a exceeds one. 
When a is less than one, the larger the import content the larger the level 
of effective protection for any given final good duty rate. In Table 2 are 
given several examples of Tanzanian effective protection for different 
combinations of the parameters a, b5 and t. 
Kenyan Production 
In analyzing Kenyan production for the Tanzanian market we want 
to follow the same procedure as above and examine the costs of production 
which occur in Kenya. We shall assume that the Imported input costs the 
same whether imported into Kenya or Tanzania. The Kenyan firm, in addition 
to its costs of production in Kenya must pay duty on the input and transfer 
tax on the value of its product at the Tanzanian border less the duty that 
has already been paid. Let us denote by r the value of Kenyan manufacture 
at the Tanzanian border. In equilibrium, the value at the border plus the 
transfer tax will equal the price inside Tanzania. 
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(6) r + |t(r - atp2) = p^l + t). ; 
For the Kenyan firm:to just break even, its costs of production plus the 
cost (including duty) of the input must equal the value of the Kenyan good 
at the Tanzanian border, 
(7) qK + P2(Hat)"= r. 
We can now substitute from equation (7) into equation (6) and eliminate r 
from the expressions 
(8) q (X+it) + d (l+at)(l+zt) - itatp = p (l+t). K 2 
This expression can now be altered by multiplying through the parentheses and 
substituting bp^ for p 
(9) q (l4t) + bp (1 + at + it) = p. (l+t) . 
K 1 1 
We can now express the Kenyan break-even cost ratio by solving equation (9) 
for q and then dividing by foreign costs of completing production, p (,1-b) . K 1 : 
qK • _ 1 + t - b (1+at+gt) 
(10) pjU-Jb) , ' (I+2t)(l-b) 
Let us note for future reference that if the transfer tax is levied.at less 
than the full legal rate we need only replace the g in equation (10) by the 
appropriate fraction; to obtain the break even cost ratio. Examples of this 
ratio are given in Table 3. . 
As was noted in the introduction, because the'import content is 
subject to both tariff and transfer tax it can occur that the Kenyan firm is 
at a disadvantage relative to foreign firms in producing for the Tanzanian 
market. To determine the combinations of duty rates and import contents for 
which this is true, let us begin by considering the border line case where 
the break even cost ratio is just one, that is Kenyan and foreign firms 
are on exactly the same footing in the Tanzanian market. Equating the right 
hand expression in equation (10) to one, cross multiplying and/clearing 
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parentheses we have the equation 
(11) 1 + t -'b - abt - Jbt = 1 +:st - b - Jbt. 
Simplifying this expression we see that the Kenyan break even cost ratio is 
one whenever 
(12) ab = 
or whenever the product of import content times the ratio of intermediate to final 
tariffs is one-half. Whenever this product exceeds one-half; the Kenyan 
12 
firm is at a disadvantage. For example, with an import content of one-half 
and the same duty .rates on input and final good the Kenyan firm has no 
advantage. Diagram one shows the combinations of these variables which 
result in the Kenyan firm being at a disadvantage. 
Tanzanian Protection Relative to Kenya 
We have calculated expressions for the protection .given Tanzanian 
and Kenyan' firms relative to foreign firms. To calculate the ratio by which 
Tanzanian costs, can exceed...Kenyan, costs, with both firms breaking even we 
need only take the ratio of the two expressions calculated above in equations 
(5) and (10). 
(13) qT _ 1 + t - M l + at) 
~ T T T ~ n r c r T I F T l T ) (1 + 2 t ) • 
From this expression,, we can. see that the presence of import content (b>0) 
increases the effective, protection given Tanzanian firms relative to those 
of Kenya. In Table 4 are tabulated some examples of this cost ratio. Comparing 
effective protection to nominal protection (equal to Jt) we see that effective 
protection always exceeds nominal protection when there is a positive import 
content. . We. can see this directly -by considering the transfer tax as made up 
of two;parts, a tax on Kenyan value-added and a tax on the import content of 
Kenyan manufactures. (Since both Kenyan and Tanzanian firms pay the same 
duty on the input, this need not be considered directly.) From the tax on 
Kenyan value-added the Tanzanian,fina receives effective protection which equals 
nominal protection. Since the Kenyan firm must also pay transfer tax on the 
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Import content effective protection exceeds nominal protection being larger 
the larger the import content. 
This suggests that if it is desired to give effective protection 
equal to nominal protection the tax could be levied just on Kenyan value-
added. Since Kenyan firms already need to declare, the duty paid on 
imported inputs (since this is not subject to transfer tax) it would not be 
• i ; _ too great an administrative change to also deduct the cost of imports from the 
tax base. Alternatively the same goal could be achieved, that is effective 
protection equal to it, without altering the Treaty by having Tanzania levy 
the transfer tax at less than the full legal rate. We can obtain an exact 
formula for the ratio of transfer tax to final tariff which.will accomplish 
this by equating the break even cost ratio to l+gt. Let us denote by c the 
ratio of transfer tax to final tariff. Then the expression for the cost ratio 
is obtained by substituting c for g wherever 5 appears in expression (13). 
Equating this expression* to the nominal break even ratio, we have, 
(14) (1 + t - b - abt)(l+ct) = (1 + t - b - abt - cbt)(l+it). 
Solving this expression for c we have 
/,cs i 1+t-b-abt (15) c = 2 i 
! l+t-abt+sbt 
In Table 5 are given several examples of c satisfying equation (15). 
If the overall tariff structure were arranged so that effective and 
nominal protection were everywhere approximately equal relative to foreign 
firms this would appear to be the leading candidate for a suitable inter-
pretation of the principles which appear to lie behind the Treaty. However, 
this does not appear to be true so we have another candidate for economic 
representation of the principles of the Treaty. One might desire to give 
Tanzanian firms one-half the effective protection relative to Kenya that they 
receive relative to foreign firms. This too can be accomplished by choosing 
an appropriate ratio of transfer tax to tariff rate.. To determine this we can 
equate expression (13);. with c substituted for 5, to one half plus one half 
times expression (5). Writing this.out, we have 
(16) (1 + t - b - abt)(l+ct)(l-b) = 5(1+t-b-abt-bet)(1-b+l+t-b-abt) 
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Solving this expression for c we have 
, , , (1-ab)(1+t-b-abt) • (17) c = 2, (1+t-b-abt-2bt(1-ab)) 
In Table 6 are given several examples of values of c which will satisfy 
12 equation (17). 
Some Complications 
A number of simplifications were made in the analysis above which 
i ........ ! 
need to be briefly considered to weigh their importance. It was assumed that 
the commodity being examined was homogeneous. Comparing similar goods produced 
in different countries there are often quality differentials as well as 
differences in design and detail making the goods close but not perfect 
substitutes. While this would greatly complicate the enalysis it probably 
does not seriously alter the general tone of the conclusions. It was also 
assumed that the.good under.analysis continued being imported from abroad 
despite the tariff structure. Thus we assumed that the world price (plus 
tariff) determined the domestic price. For some goods this is not the case 
and a separate analysis of Tanzanian protection relative to Kenya is needed 
for the case where the equilibrium price depends on the volume of production. 
Third, the analysis above was completely static. This limitation is important 
since the Treaty provides a maximum life of eight years for any particular 
transfer tax. For a Tanzanian firm considering expanding production by 
purchasing capital equipment with a life of 15 0^*20 years, say, the protection 
relative to Kenya will only be present for the first part of this period. 
However, this does not involve a serious change in the results above since, 
in present discounted value terms, the first eic^ ht years is an overwhelming 
fraction of the life of such equipment. This minor alteration is not valid 
though for a Kenyan firm considering the purchase of capital equipment to 
expand its production for the Tanzanian market. If a Kenyan firm could just 
break even o v e r the entire period then it is probably losing money in the early 
period while recouping its position in the later years. The present dis-
counted value of profits could probably be increased by delaying the purchase 
of the capital equipment. Thus the eventual lapse of the transfer tax does 
not seriously reduce the disincentive for production for Kenyan firms during 
the life of the tax. 
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The effective protection arising from the indirect effects of the 
tax seem more important and more variable in size. If for example, the 
second plant were to start one year earlier, the impact' on the first plants 
profits in that year would be considerable, probably more than halving them. 
Since this seems quantitatively important, we need to inquire'into, the' 
probable impact of the transfer tax on the timing of the start of the second 
firm. The change in timing will depend on the relation between the increased 
profitability due to transfer taxation and the rate of growth of profitability 
from the growth of the East African market. Diagram 2 shows two possible 
cases. As a result of the transfer tax the potential profitability of the 
second plant gets shifted up from, the solid line to the dotted line (we 
ignore for convenience the fact that the transfer tax will only be in force 
for a maximum of eight years). In both Diagram 2a and 2b the increased 
profitability per unit time is the same. However because of different rate 
of growth of profitability there is a considerable difference in the induced 
change in timing of the building of the second plant, which will occur when 
the plant becomes profitable (T or T') for the pattern of profitability shown. 
If one further takes into account the eventual construction of a third plant 
the situation becomes more complicated although the basic principles remain 
the same. For any particular industry, this effect may be large, although 
this need not necessarily be so. 
As the East African experience su.ggests there are many forms of 
economic cooperation which are mutually preferable to non-cooperation. 
A search for the particular forms most appealing in the current situation 
is a valuable search. It might be worth while for the Community to 
experiment with transfer taxes at less than the full legal rate while 
sponsoring research into its effects on production. 
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DIAGRAM 2 
2a 2b 
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New Industries 
The analysis above assumed that the commodit};- being considered was 
being produced in both East African countries. Presumably, it would be 
appropriate for small scale industries, where the presence of the transfer 
tax will affect the market shares being produced in the two countries. A 
somewhat different analysis is needed for new industries where the entire 
East African market is needed at first to justify production. Without 
presenting a formal model we can examine the elements which will determine 
the importance of transfer taxes in determining the location of the first 
plant. 
We wish to compare the relative advantage of Kenya vis-a-vis 
Tanzania in the presence of the Treaty with that arising in a common market . 
Presumably, if a single plant were located in Tanzania or Uganda more than 
30% of its output would be exported to the rest of East Africa, even after 
the apprearance of a second plant. Thus it seems likely that no transfer 
tax would be levied, at least in the near future. Thus the absolute advantage 
of locating the first plant' in Tanzania is not seriously affected by the 
possibility of transfer taxes.. 
Now, let us examine the change in advantage from locating in Kenya 
This change can be divided into two parts, the direct disadvantage of having 
to pay transfer taxes and the indirect disadvantage of the transfer tax 
affecting the timing of construction of a second plant, thus greatly 
decreasing the size of the first plant's market sooner than other-Wise. 
The direct disadvantage does not seem large. The taxes paid will only'be 
paid on a fraction of the output of the first plant - the fraction sold in 
Tanzania - which will no doubt be less than a third of its output and 
probably considerably less with uneven territorial division of the 
East African market. Second,.the firm will not start paying taxes until the 
second plant is set up, which is probably several years into the future. Thus 
•the force of discounting further reduces the importance of transfer taxes 
relative to the firm's other costs. Combining these two aspects, we see 
that the effective protection for this decision is probably one-sixth or less 
(and possibly much less) that described above for currently produced goods. 
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F O O T N O T E S 
1. The right to levy transfer taxes is given.to. whatevericountry is in 
trade deficit in manufactured goods within East Africa. For ease of 
reference the current situation where Tanzania can levy taxes against 
Kenyan and Ugandan produce while Uganda can levy taxes against Kenyan 
produce is referred to. 
2. A list of manufactured goods is given in the Treaty, but this is a 
minimal list since it includes the category/- miscellaneous manufactured 
products. 
3. This is qualified in that a country whose exports are at least 80% of 
imports may not levy more transfer taxes although it can maintain 
existing ones, whether existing taxes must be removed if trade comes 
into balance is ambiguous in my reading of the Treaty. 
4. Determination of the duty paid may be an administrative problem for 
many-product firms. It should be remembered that this duty is 
received by the country importing the final good. This is true even 
if the country of input import.gives a duty drawback. 
5. This production must either be taking.place or reasonably expected 
within three months. 
6. In cases where the transfer tax results in a significant deviation of 
trade from East African to'foreign firms, steps (although the steps 
to be taken are unspecified) will be taken to prevent the deviation. 
Determination of deviation as well as definitions of trade balances 
are based on the statistics of the Customs and Excise Department, involving 
the usual delays of statistical computation. 
7. For a discussion of effective protection see, for example W. M. Corden 
"The Structure of a Tariff and the Effective Protection Rate,1' Journal 
of Political Economy, .June 1966 . 
8. We ignore the presence of excise taxation in Tanzania. 
9. We assume for the present that the transfer tax is levied at the full 
legal rate. 
10. This can be seen by differentiations qK/ Pi(i-b) with respect to a and 
b. The former .is always negative and the latter negative for a>}-. 
11. This would however remove much of the protection for Kenyan producers 
of inputs for Kenyan producers of final ^ oods for the Tanzanian market. 
The present Treaty has the same effect to a lesser degree since the duty 
paid on the input is not subject to transfer tax. 
12. One might attempt to build an economic model of the principles of the 
Treaty around the notion that a Kenyan firm should pay one half the duty 
(including transfer tax) that a foreign firm pays. This notion is not 
very helpful for even without import content this- is not true with the 
transfer tax at the full legal rate. Furthermore, for goods with an 
import content in excess of one-half and the same tariff rate on input 
and final good, the Kenyan firm must receive a subsidy to satisfy this 
relationship. Alternatively one might have .Kenyan firms pay in transfer 
tax one-half the additional tariff due to importing the final good 
rather than the intermediate good. This is -very close to the n-ti-n of 
effective protection used alone. 
